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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5484
The 20th Human Development Report has introduced a 
new version of its famous Human Development Index 
(HDI). The HDI aggregates country-level attainments 
in life expectancy, schooling and income per capita. 
Each year’s rankings by the HDI are keenly watched 
in both rich and poor countries. The main change in 
the 2010 HDI is that it relaxes its past assumption of 
perfect substitutability between its three components. 
However, most users will probably not realize that the 
new HDI has also greatly reduced its implicit weight on 
longevity in poor countries, relative to rich ones. A poor 
country experiencing falling life expectancy due to (say) 
This paper—a product of the office of the Director, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the department 
to  assess whether prevailing development indices are providing a reliable guide to assessing country performance and 
guiding policy making. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
author may be contacted at mravallion@worldbank.org.  
a collapse in its health-care system could still see its HDI 
improve with even a small rate of economic growth. By 
contrast, the new HDI’s valuations of the gains from 
extra schooling seem unreasonably high—many times 
greater than the economic returns to schooling. These 
troubling tradeoffs could have been largely avoided using 
a different aggregation function for the HDI, while still 
allowing imperfect substitution. While some difficult 
value judgments are faced in constructing and assessing 
the HDI, making its assumed tradeoffs more explicit 
would be a welcome step. 
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1.   Introduction    
The Human Development Index (HDI) aims to provide a broader characterization of 
“development” than is possible by focusing on national income alone. For this purpose, the HDI 
aggregates country-level attainments in life expectancy and education, as well as income. The 
index has been published since 1990 in the UNDP’s Human Development Reports (HDRs).  
Each year’s scores and rankings by the HDI are keenly watched in both rich and poor 
countries. The countries that do well on the index are congratulated by each new HDR.
2 
Politicians and the media often take note. The HDI aims not only to monitor human 
development, but to encourage countries to take actions that promote it. The latest (2010) HDR 
claims that the HDI and its various descendants “…yield many novel results—and insights—that 
can guide development policy debates and designs” (UNDP, 2010, p.8).  UNDP (undated) 
documents numerous examples of the policy influence of the HDRs, including the HDI.  
As in any composite index, users should know what weights are attached to the HDI’s 
dimensions, to properly judge if it has got the balance right.
3 The weight in any given dimension 
can be defined as the index’s first partial derivative (“slope”) with respect to that dimension. 
Since the units of the index are arbitrary (the HDI is normalized to lie in the 0, 1 interval) what 
really matters is the relative weights of its component dimensions. In other words, we need to 
know the assumed tradeoffs, as given by the HDI’s marginal rate of substitution (MRS), i.e., how 
much of one desired component of the HDI must be given up for an extra unit of another 
component, keeping the overall index constant. If a policy or economic change entails that one of 
the positively-valued dimensions increases at the expense of another dimension, then it is the 
MRS that tells us whether human development is deemed to have risen or fallen.  
                                                            
2   In answer to the question: “Which countries have been most successful in furthering the human 
development of their people?” (UNDP, 2010, p.41) the HDR looks at HDI indices over 1970-2010 for 
135 countries and identifies the “top 10 movers,” defined by the rate of increase in their HDI relative to 
its 1970 value; the countries are Oman, China, Nepal, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Lao PDR, Tunisia, South 
Korea, Algeria and Morocco. At the other extreme, the report identifies three countries for which the 
2008 HDI is lower than its 1970 value: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe.    
3   On the importance of knowing the weights built into a composite index of development see 
Ravallion (2010a), which also discusses a number of other issues not touched on here, including the 
robustness of country rankings and whether aggregation of the core dimensions is useful for policy.   3 
 
While the HDI has clearly aimed to influence policy makers, and appears to have had 
some success, the interest in identifying its tradeoffs does not rest on a view that the HDI is the 
maximand of some policy calculus. The interest stems instead from the need to understand the 
properties of the index. We can all agree that GDP is an incomplete metric of development.
4 The 
real issue is how we form a better composite index, should we feel the need for one.
5 What 
tradeoffs does the index attach to the various components? Only if we accept those tradeoffs can 
we be confident that the composite index is adequately measuring what it claims to measure. 
In common with other “mashup indices” (Ravallion, 2010a), the HDI’s tradeoffs are not 
constrained by theory, though economic theory can offer some insights into how one might form 
a composite index of human development.
6 The authors of the HDR set themselves free to pick 
the HDI’s variables and weights. From 1990 to 2009 the HDI gave equal (linear) weights to three 
functions of its core dimensions for health, education and income.
7  
While the choice of variables and their weights can certainly be questioned, the HDI has 
at least appeared to be transparent and simple. That appearance is not quite so evident on closer 
inspection. Indeed, the HDI has never made explicit its tradeoffs across the core dimensions; 
users are only told the weights on its three derived functions of those core dimensions, even 
though the deeper tradeoffs between the core dimensions are clearly more salient.  Since income 
is one of those core dimensions, the tradeoffs can also be monetized, which makes them easier to 
understand, and to assess whether they are appropriate by comparison with other research 
findings, including on the economic returns to better health and education.
8   
                                                            
4   The claims regularly made by the HDR’s that “development” is typically defined solely in terms 
of GDP have surely been exaggerated, as Srinivasan (1994) argued in an early critique of the HDI. 
5   Saying that there is more than one relevant indicator of development does not in itself imply that 
we need to force them into one dimension; see Ravallion (2010a) on this point. 
6   In the context of aggregating mean income and life expectancy, Dowrick et al. (2003) show how 
revealed preference theory can guide the methodological choices. Also see the more structural economic 
models in Becker et al. (2005) and Jones and Klenow (2010), and the latent-variable statistical model 
used by Høyland et al. (2010) to set the weights for a version of the HDI.   
7   The income variable has been somewhat controversial, with some observers arguing against its 
inclusion in the HDI; on the case for including income, see Anand and Sen (2000). 
8   Advocates of making human development the overarching development goal often reject 
monetary valuations. However the fact of using money per se as the metric of value cannot be 
objectionable; rather the issue is how we assess “value.” For further discussion and references to the 
literature on money metrics of social welfare see Ravallion (2010a). 4 
 
This paper examines the tradeoffs embodied in the latest version of the HDI, as presented 
in UNDP (2010).
9 After summarizing how the index has changed, the paper turns to its 
valuations of longevity and schooling. The paper questions whether the HDI’s implicit 
valuations are sending the right signals to governments trying to monitor and promote human 
development. Next the paper shows that the troubling tradeoffs found in the 2010 HDI could 
have been avoided to a large extent using an alternative aggregation function from the 
literature—indeed, a more general form of the old HDI, as proposed by Chakravarty (2003).  A 
final section concludes.   
2.  The Human Development Index 
The three core dimensions of the HDI are life expectancy (LE), schooling (S) and income 
(Y). The changes introduced in the 20
th Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010) concern the 
precise measures used for these core dimensions, and how they are aggregated to form the 
composite index. Life expectancy is the only core dimension that is unchanged in the 2010 HDI. 
Gross national income (GNI) has replaced GDP, both still at purchasing power parity (PPP) and 
logged. The two variables used to measure the third component, education, have changed. 
Literacy and the gross enrolment rate (as used in the old HDI) have been replaced by mean years 
of schooling (MS) and the expected years of schooling (ES), given by the years of schooling that 
a child can expect to receive given current enrolment rates.  
As in the past, the three core dimensions of the HDI are first put on a common (0, 1) 
scale. The rescaled indicators are:    
    
       
                        ,                                                                               1.1  
    
            
                                                                                                                  1.2  
where the “max” and “min” denote the assumed bounds (in obvious notation). (Note also that S 
is itself a composite index of MS and ES, which I return to.)  
                                                            
9   In addition to its new HDI, UNDP (2010) introduced a new “multidimensional poverty measure,” 
which raises a number of distinct issues, as discussed in Ravallion (2010a).  5 
 
The bounds used in rescaling all three variables to common units have also been 
modified. It used to be assumed that life expectancy is bounded below by 25 years, and above by 
85 years; in the 2010 HDI these bounds changed to 20 years and 83.2 years (Japan’s life 
expectancy). In the 2010 HDI, GNI per capita is bounded below by $163 (the lowest value, for 
Zimbabwe in 2008) and above by $108,211 (for the United Arab Emirates in 1980). The new 
education variables are both taken to have lower bounds of zero with MS bounded above by 13.2 
years (the US in 2000) and ES bounded above by 20.6 years (Australia, 2002). 
Figure 1 gives the density functions of the three scaled indicators across the 169 countries 
for which UNDP (2010) provides estimates of the HDI. The distributions are quite different, with 
notably higher values for life expectancy than schooling and (especially) income. There are also 
signs of bi-modality for schooling and life expectancy. There are 14 countries with life 
expectancy under 50 years and 13 with mean years of schooling less than three years. (Five 
countries are common to both categories.)   
An important change (in the present context) is in how the three scaled indicators are 
aggregated. The old HDI used their arithmetic mean: 
                           /3                                                                                           2  
The 2010 HDI uses instead their geometric mean: 
                     
 /   
 /   
 /                                                                                                       3   
Similarly, the way the two education variables are aggregated has changed, so that the new HDI 
has           /          .    /       . . Using either (2) or (3) the HDI is automatically 
bounded below by zero and above by unity.  
  Note that equation (3) embodies two distinct sources of nonlinearity in the income effect 
(unlike the one source in (2), namely through the log transformation). In        there is both 
the log transformation of income built into IY and the power transformation in (3). On twice 
differentiating       with respect to Y one finds that the 2010 HDI is still strictly concave in 
income. However, the combined effect of these two sources of nonlinearity is to impart a large 
positive income effect on the HDI’s valuations of longevity and schooling, as we will see later.    6 
 
Why did the 2010 HDR switch from equation (2) to (3)? The report offers the following 
explanation:
10 
 “Poor performance in any dimension is now directly reflected in the HDI, and there is no longer 
perfect substitutability across dimensions. This method captures how well rounded a country’s 
performance is across the three dimensions. As a basis for comparisons of achievement, this 
method is also more respectful of the intrinsic differences in the dimensions than a simple 
average is. It recognizes that health, education and income are all important, but also that it is 
hard to compare these different dimensions of well-being and that we should not let changes in 
any of them go unnoticed.” (UNDP, 2010, p.15) 
These reasons are not as compelling as they may seem at first glance. It is true that the old HDI 
assumed that the scaled indices (   ,     and    ) were perfect substitutes (constant MRS), but 
this was not true of the core dimensions. Since income enters on a log scale (and is only then 
rescaled to the 0, 1 interval), income and life expectancy (or income and schooling) were not in 
fact perfect substitutes even in the old HDI. And relaxing perfect substitutability between 
   ,     and     does not imply that one should switch to the form in (3); one can do so by using 
instead the generalized (old) HDI proposed by Chakravarty (2003).  (I will return to 
Chakravarty’s index in section V.) The other arguments made by the 2010 HDR for switching to 
the geometric mean are also less than fully compelling.  It is not evident in what sense using the 
geometric mean makes poor performance more “directly” reflected in the HDI, or more “well 
rounded,” or “more respectful of the intrinsic differences in the dimensions,” or that using this 
aggregation formula means that we do “not let changes in any dimension) go unnoticed.” Indeed, 
one can argue, to the contrary, that the HDI’s new aggregation formula hides partial success 
amongst countries doing poorly in just one dimension. As dimension   approaches      we see 
that        approaches zero no matter what value is taken by the other dimensions.  
Consider, for example, Zimbabwe, which has the lowest        of 0.14 (UNDP, 
2010)—and it is the lowest by far, at about 60% of the next lowest. Yet this is due to one 
component that currently scores very low, namely income; Zimbabwe’s   =0.01—the lowest of 
any country, and by a wide margin (60% of the next lowest value)—while   =0.52 and    =0.43, 
both well above the bottom. Indeed, there are 56 countries with a lower schooling index than 
Zimbabwe’s, yet this relative success is hidden by the HDI’s new aggregation formula, given its 
                                                            
10   A number of commentators in the literature have advocated a multiplicative form for the HDI, 
such as (3), including Desai (1991), soon after the HDI first appeared, and Sagar and Najam (1998) 
(although the 2010 HDR does not refer to these antecedents in the literature). 7 
 
multiplicative form. Using the arithmetic mean instead (with other data unchanged), Zimbabwe 
still has a low HDI, but it ranks higher than six countries. (And Zimbabwe does even better using 
the alternative HDI discussed in Section V.) 
  The rest of this paper examines the country-specific tradeoffs implied by the 2010 HDI, 
and how they have changed. On a priori grounds it is unclear what effect relaxing perfect 
substitutability between the scaled indicators (   ,    and   ) would have on the tradeoffs in the 
core dimensions. Whether the MRS increases or decreases will depend on the data.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the contours (holding the HDI constant) between log income 
per capita and life expectancy for both the arithmetic mean (the straight line contour) and the 
geometric mean (the convex one). As usual, the MRS is the absolute value of the slope of the 
contour.  For convenience, countries A and B are taken to have the same HDI either way.
11 For 
country A, the switch implies a higher MRS, while for B the MRS is lower.  The fact that we are 
more interested in the MRS with the core dimension of income (“unlogged”) adds further 
theoretical ambiguity to the effect of this change in the HDI. 
  While the focus here is on the HDI’s implicit tradeoffs, knowing those tradeoffs is clearly 
not sufficient for deciding whether policies that promote health care or education will promote 
human development. Even leaving aside the issue of whether the HDI is an adequate 
representation of that goal, we would also need to know the costs, assuming that it is national 
income net of those costs that is valued for human development.
12 And those costs will vary 
across countries. The costs of lengthening life or raising school attainments are also likely to be 
higher in richer countries, given that health and education services are labor intensive, and 
(hence) will tend to be more expensive in rich countries where wages are higher.  
I will note some comparisons with the costs of increasing longevity, drawing on the 
literature. However, this paper’s focus on the valuations built into the HDI is primarily intended 
                                                            
11   In other words, the scaled values of log income and life expectance are swapped between A and 
B. More generally, depending on the data and assumed bounds, the switch to the geometric mean may 
alter the HDI ranking of A and B. 
12   For example, let VLE denote the monetary valuation (MRS) for longevity and let MCLE denote 
its marginal cost i.e., the income forgone for other purposes when life expectancy is increased by one 
year. Then higher life expectancy will increase the HDI if (and only if) VLE>MCLE. 8 
 
to inform public understanding of the HDI, rather than to inform discussions of what policies 
might increase human development.  
In examining the implications of the changes to the HDI for its implicit valuations, I 
focus first on the HDI’s valuation of longevity, after which I turn to its valuation of schooling.     
3.  The HDI’s troubling valuations of longevity 
While the weights attached to the HDI’s scaled indices (   ,     and    ) are explicit, 
those on the core dimensions (LE, S and Y) are not, and arguably it is these weights that we care 
about in understanding the properties of the HDI.
13  The HDRs have never discussed explicitly 
the valuations on its core dimensions, and they can be questioned. Ravallion (1997) pointed out 
the seemingly low monetary value implicitly attached to longevity in poor countries by past 
HDIs (using an earlier functional form). As we will see, it turns out that the changes introduced 
in the 2010 HDR have lowered the HDI’s valuation of longevity in poor countries even further. 
The HDI’s marginal weights can be readily derived by differentiating equation (2) or (3) 
with respect to each variable. The effect on these weights of switching to the new formula for the 
HDI is theoretically ambiguous, and will vary across countries according to: 
       
  
/
       
  
 
      
  
          , ,                                                     4     
For longevity we find that              for 164 of the 169 countries. So the new HDI has 
lowered the weight on longevity for all but five countries (using the new bounds). For the old 
HDI the marginal value on longevity was a constant,  3                      0.0054. (Going 
from the lower bound of life expectancy of 20 years, as assumed by the 2010 HDI, to the upper 
bound of 83.2 years, adds 0.34 to the HDI.) This changed when the HDR switched to the 
geometric mean; the marginal weight on longevity then became: 
       
   
 
      
3            
                                                                                         5  
                                                            
13   The HDI is not alone in this respect. Ravallion (2010a) discusses a range of composite indices of 
development which tell their users little or nothing about the weights attached to their core dimensions.  
Their weights are made explicit, but not in what is (arguably) the most relevant space. 9 
 
Figure 3 plots the new and the old weights on longevity against national income per 
capita (on a log scale to avoid bunching up at low incomes). It can be seen that a strong positive 
income gradient has been introduced, with markedly lower weights for poorer countries (in terms 
of GNI per capita).  This pattern is not confined to income; the weight on longevity is also 
positively correlated with the (new) HDI (r=0.697; which is significant at 0.001level using a 
robust standard error) and life expectancy (r=0.347—also significant at 0.001 level).
14  
By contrast to longevity, the new formula for the HDI increased the weight on income for 
the bulk of the countries. In particular, one finds that             for 148 countries.  
The HDI implicitly puts a monetary valuation on an extra year of life, where that 
valuation is defined by the tradeoff between longevity and income, i.e., the extra income needed 
to compensate for a year less of life expectancy, keeping the HDI constant. This is given by the 
ratio of the HDI’s marginal weight on longevity to its weight on income. Denote this tradeoff by 
VLE. We have (in obvious notation): 
        
                   
                                                                                                6.1  
        
               
                                                                                                  6.2  
It can be seen that        is directly proportional to  , given the bounds.  
The direction of the effect on VLE of switching from the old to the new formula for the 
HDI is theoretically ambiguous, and depends on both the data and the bounds used for rescaling 
the variables. Since the weight on longevity has fallen for the bulk of countries, while it has risen 
for income, we can also expect lower monetary valuations of longevity. More precisely, it is 
plain from equations (6.1) and (6.2) that                    if (and only if)          .  Out of the 
169 countries, I find that the monetary valuations of longevity have been revised down for 158 
countries (161 if one uses the new bounds). The Annex gives my calculations of the HDI’s 
valuations of longevity for all 169 countries, as well as the 2010 HDI and GNI per capita in 
                                                            
14   Given the function form, the new HDI is strictly concave in its core dimensions, but this only tells 
us that the weight on x declines with x, holding the other two components constant. In these data-based 
comparisons, the other variables are not constant, and so their interaction effects come into play.    10 
 
2008. Figure 4 plots the valuations against national income. (I return to explain the “marginal 
cost” series in Figure 4.) 
The HDI’s value of longevity in the poorest country, Zimbabwe, is a remarkably low 
$0.51 per year, representing less than 0.3% of that country’s (very low) mean income in 2008. 
Thus the 2010 HDI implies that if Zimbabwe takes a policy action that increases national income 
by a mere $0.52 or more per person per year at the cost of reducing average life expectancy by 
one year, then the country will have promoted its “human development.”   
Granted Zimbabwe has an unusually low GNI. The next lowest valuation of longevity is 
for Liberia, for which the HDI attaches a value of $5.51 per year to an extra year of life 
expectancy; this is 10 times Zimbabwe’s valuation, though it is still only 1.7% of Liberia’s 
annual income. The value tends to rise with income and reaches about $9,000 per year in the 
richest countries (Figure 4). The highest valuation of longevity is 17,000 times higher than the 
lowest. Even dropping Zimbabwe’s (exceptionally low) valuation, the differential is 1,600.    
The least-squares elasticity (the ordinary regression coefficient of          on    ) is 
1.208 (with a robust standard error of 0.033; n=169). This is significantly greater than unity, 
implying that the HDI’s valuation of longevity as a proportion of mean income tends to rise with 
mean income. The elasticity is also higher than most past estimates of the income elasticity of 
market-based estimates of the value of statistical life.
15  
The fact that the valuation of longevity as a proportion of mean income tends to rise with 
mean income is confirmed by Figure 5. (The highest value as a proportion of GNI turns out to be 
almost 16%, in Equatorial Guinea, though this is clearly an outlier.)  By contrast, the old HDI 
had an income elasticity of unity, and (when evaluated with the HDI’s new bounds)        is 
almost exactly 10% of each country’s annual income. 
The changes to the HDI have devalued longevity, especially in poor countries. Given the 
construction of the index,       /       is directly proportional to       /  (equations 6.1 
and 6.2); the constant turns out to be 10.014. So by dividing the vertical axis of Figure 5 by 10 
(noting that the axis is in percent), we can also read it as a graph for       /      . (Selected 
                                                            
15   A review of the evidence by Viscussi and Aldy (2003) concludes that the income elasticity is in 
the range 0.5-0.6. 11 
 
points for       /       are indicated on the vertical axis in parentheses.) There was a roughly 
25% downward revision on average (mean       /         0.748). If one focuses on the 
poorest half of countries (GNI per capita below the median) then the average downward revision 
was close to 40% (mean       /         0.620 ; n=84); for the poorest quarter, the valuation 
of longevity has been almost halved ((mean       /         0.545; n=42)).   
Figure 6 provides a “blow up” of Figure 4 for the poorest half of countries (in terms of 
GNI per capita), as well as the values implied by the old HDI aggregation using the arithmetic 
mean. (I also give the old valuation of life using the arithmetic mean and old bounds.) It can be 
seen that changing the bounds alone in the old HDI would not have produced this large 
downward revision to the index’s monetary valuation of longevity. Rather it was the combined 
effect of switching to the geometric mean, the form of the scales used and (of course) the data. 
Given the scales and aggregation formulae, the marked devaluation of longevity stems from the 
fact that            for all except eight of the 169 countries, implying that                  .  
(This difference in the distributions was already evident in Figure 1.) Whether this holds depends 
on the assumed bounds built into the HDI. For example, a higher upper bound for LE would have 
lowered the value of life implicit in the old HDI; I find that        would have been quite close 
to the level of        at         100. The somewhat arbitrary and time varying choice of 
bounds has played an important role in the HDI’s devaluations of longevity. 
The income gradient in the HDI’s monetary valuations of longevity appears to be 
substantially greater than the gradient in the marginal costs of longevity.  Dowrick, Dunlop and 
Quiggin (DDQ) (1998) estimate marginal costs of an extra year of life expectancy for 58 
countries in 1980, which I have simply converted to 2008 prices using the US CPI. There are a 
number of comparability problems between the DDQ estimates and my calculations of VLE, so 
these calculations should only be considered as broadly indicative for the present purposes.
16 The 
DDQ estimates are also given in Figure 4. Their estimated marginal cost of a one year increase in 
life expectancy is 400 times higher in the country with the highest cost (Denmark in their 
                                                            
16   Probably most importantly, updating solely for inflation in the US misses the structural changes 
in growing developing economies, which entail changes in their relative prices; in particular, we can 
expect that the cost of attaining higher longevity may have risen more in rapidly growing economies such 
as China than these estimates indicate. This is suggested by comparisons of PPP estimates across different 
rounds of the International Comparison Program; see Ravallion (2010b).  12 
 
sample) than the lowest (Madagascar). This is far less than my calculations of the differential in 
the valuation of longevity implicit in the HDI. The DDQ estimates are only roughly similar to 
the HDI’s valuations for the poorest countries, but the HDI’s valuations greatly exceed marginal 
costs among most countries, and the gap is very large for the richest countries.  
Across individuals, one expects the value attached to extra longevity to rise with income.  
Even if (instantaneous) utility depends only on consumption, a high income allows more to be 
consumed in the extra years of life, giving higher expected utility.
17 Similarly, one would expect 
people in rich countries to be willing to pay more for extra longevity, and they clearly do. 
However, such observations do not justify building an income gradient (let alone a steep 
gradient) into the valuation of longevity. The HDI is clearly intended to embody social values, 
which need not accord with private ones.  
With reference to the private valuations of “statistical life”—such as derived from 
contingent valuation questions in surveys or wage premia paid for risky jobs—Ackerman and 
Heinzerling (2001, p.18) note a similar concern: 
“Calculation of the link between average income and the value of a statistical life could, if 
applied indiscriminately, lead to the unacceptable implication that rich people, or residents of rich 
nations, are worth more than the poor.” 
While the HDI is not deriving its valuations of longevity from such sources, the fact that it puts a 
higher value to an extra year of life for people in rich countries than poor ones is arguably no less 
of an example of the “unacceptable implication” that Ackerman and Heinzerling refer to.  
  This troubling tradeoff in the 2010 HDI will clearly influence its rankings of performance 
in human development. However, a more worrying concern arises if the index influences 
(domestic and international) policy making. The HDI’s embedded tradeoffs imply that, in the 
interests of promoting human development—or at least improving its HDI—the government of a 
poor country should not be willing to pay more than a very small sum (in $’s and as a percent of 
national income) for an extra year of expected lifespan for its citizens, while the government of a 
rich country would be encouraged to spend vastly more for the same gain in longevity—17,000 
times more if one compares my calculation of        for the richest country with the poorest. 
                                                            
17   Suppose instead that (i) utility is strictly increasing in both life expectancy and income; (ii) the 
marginal utility of higher life expectancy does not fall with higher income, and that (iii) there is declining 
marginal utility of income. Then the MRS will be an increasing function of income.   13 
 
Serious objections would naturally be raised to any proposal for public action within one country 
that rested on assigning a lower value to life to poor citizens than to rich ones, let alone a relative 
value that is such a tiny fraction. The same objections arise in a global context.  
One is led to question whether these valuations are consistent with promoting “human 
development.” Yet, the 20 HDRs have largely avoided making explicit this potentially troubling 
tradeoff, although the basic problem was noted in early commentaries (Ravallion, 1997).  
4.  The HDI’s valuations of schooling 
The fact that the HDI’s education variables have changed is not of obvious concern in 
this context, so I will only use the new schooling variables in the 2010 HDI. Applying equation 
(4), I find that that the new HDI’s aggregation method has put a higher weight on schooling for 
119 of the 169 countries (i.e., all those with            ).  
The ratio of the old and new weights in (4) does not depend on precisely how a gain in 
schooling is allocated between mean actual years of schooling and mean expected years 
(assuming, naturally, that it is allocated the same way for both calculations). However, in 
calculating the HDI’s new valuation of schooling one does need to know that allocation. I shall 
assume that an extra year is added to both mean current schooling (MS) and the expected years 
of schooling (ES).
18 While I will use the new education variables, I will keep their old 
aggregation function, including the use of the arithmetic mean of the (scaled) schooling 
variables. Then the HDI’s implicit valuations of extra schooling are given by: 
                                                           /2                            7.1  
                                           /2                                                        7.2     
Figure 7 plots       and       against (log) GNI. (Later I will explain the series in 
Figure 7 labeled “Chakravarty index.”) Similarly to longevity, we see a marked income gradient, 
although flat at low incomes. The new HDI values an extra year of schooling at $1.68 per person 
per year in Zimbabwe, about 1% of mean income; the next lowest is for the Congo where 
                                                            
18   There is some support for this assumption in the data; the regression coefficient of expected 
schooling on mean current schooling is 0.88, which is close to unity, although it is still significantly less 
than unity (t=2.54, based on a robust standard error; n=169). 14 
 
     =$33 per year, or 11% of annual income. At the other extreme,       rises to $53,000 per 
year in the country with the second highest GNI per person, representing 67% of that country’s 
GNI.  The valuation of schooling has increased in 94 countries, though the increase is more 
marked amongst high-income countries. Given the cross-country differences in schooling, the 
valuation of schooling as a proportion of GNI does not rise with GNI above some point; Figure 8 
plots      /  against GNI. (The highest      /  is for Burkina Faso, but this is an outlier.)   
While the HDI’s implicit valuations of longevity seem low, it’s valuations on schooling 
seem high. In constructing a composite index such as the HDI, there is a (rather poorly-
understood) issue about what dimensions are intrinsically, versus instrumentally, important.  We 
can all agree that a longer life is valued intrinsically, independently of income. However, it is not 
quite so clear that education has such a large intrinsic value (as assumed by the HDI), rather than 
being (very) important instrumentally to income and (hence) welfare.  
In defense of the HDI, one might argue that the benefits of extra schooling are not fully 
reflected in current incomes; better educated parents pass advantages onto their children, leading 
to higher future incomes. (Possibly the new HDI’s introduction of the variable for expected 
schooling is trying to capture this effect.) But it is a moot point just how much extra one would 
allow for such an effect, on top of the economic return to schooling.  The HDI is presumably 
measuring a country’s current human development not its future value.  
If we compare the HDI’s valuations on schooling with the returns implied by earnings 
regressions, the HDI’s valuations are clearly very much higher. The regression coefficient of log 
earnings on years of schooling is typically around 0.1; see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002). 
So it seems that the HDI is putting a much larger value on the returns to schooling than is 
reflected in current earnings. Indeed, the HDI’s valuation in developing countries appears to be 
roughly four times the labor market returns to schooling.
19 
Finally, Figure 9 compares the new HDI’s valuations for longevity and schooling. What 
is most striking is how much higher the HDI’s implicit valuation of schooling is than its 
                                                            
19   For high-income countries, the ratios of the valuation of extra schooling to mean income in 
Figure 6 are roughly seven times the coefficients on years of schooling reported by Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos (2002, Table 4, p.14). However, Banerjee and Duflo (2005) question whether the evidence 
supports the claim that returns to education vary much across countries.  15 
 
valuation of longevity.  A shorter but better schooled life is preferred by the designers of the 
HDI. One is left wondering how many of the world’s poor—many living short lives by rich-
country standards—would agree.   
5.  Could the HDI’s troubling tradeoffs have been avoided? 
  Instead of using the geometric mean, suppose that the HDR’s team had generalized its 
old additive HDI in the natural form proposed by Chakravarty (2003), giving the “generalized 
(old) HDI:”  
   
                               /3                                                                          8  
where f is some smooth, twice-differentiable, concave function mapping from the [0,1] to [0,1] 
with f(0)=0 and f(1)=1. Chakravarty (2003) shows that the form in (8) satisfies three axioms: 
normalization (if all three components,      , take the same value then that value is the HDI), 
consistency in aggregation (the HDI for a sum of component indices is equal to the 
corresponding sum of the HDIs across the components) and symmetry (the HDI is unaffected by 
permutations of its components).
20 Consistency of aggregation forces the HDI to be linearly 
additive in the      ’s as in equation (8). Chakravarty proposed a parametric special case of (8) 
in which          
  for  0       1 , giving an index that I will label     
 .  The old HDI is the 
limiting case when   =1, and only then does the index impose perfect substitutability (constant 
MRS) between the   s. I will present empirical results here for  =0.5 and 0.25. 
  With two further modifications, this special case of the Chakravarty index can take us a 
long way toward avoiding, or at least attenuating, the troubling tradeoffs in UNDP’s (2010) new 
HDI. The first change is to replace lnY with Y in equation (1.2) so that               /
             .
21  This change is important, since it removes a source of the positive income 
effect on the weights implicit in the new HDI. The second change is to use the arithmetic mean 
of the two schooling variables, MS and ES (and their bounds), rather than their geometric mean.  
                                                            
20   Chakravarty (2003) actually proves a more powerful result: an even more general index will 
satisfy these three axioms if and only if it takes the form of equation (8). 
21   Note that this still allows diminishing marginal returns to income; the new HDI’s functional 
form—in which income is logged within the scaled index, and then the index is raised to the power of 
1/3—is arguably an “overkill” since one only needs one source of nonlinearity. 16 
 
With these modifications, we can avoid the troubling property of the 2010 HDI in Figure 
3, whereby the marginal effect on the index of an extra year of life rises with national income per 
capita (and the HDI itself). Indeed, we now have the reverse slope, with higher weight on 
longevity in poorer countries; Figure 10 gives the weights on longevity implied by     
 , for 
r=0.5 and 0.25.  Instead of a higher weight on longevity in richer countries, we now find that the 
weight rises from 0.0026 in one of the richest countries to 0.0042 in the poorest (r=0.5).  The 
pattern is similar using r=0.25, though the negative gradient is less steep.  
The implied tradeoffs with income are given by:  




                 
             
           ,                                                             9  
We still find higher monetary valuations on longevity and schooling in richer countries, but 
    
  gives higher valuations for poor countries than        and the troubling income gradient 
is much attenuated. Figure 11 compares the valuations on longevity in        with those 
implied by     
  for r=0.5 and 0.25; Figure 7 gives the corresponding valuations for schooling 
(only for r=0.5 to avoid cluttering up the graph; the series for r=0.25 is similar to the pattern in 
Figure 11). In both cases, the implied valuations rise with income per capita, but much less 
steeply than implied by the 2010 HDI. The lower value of   reduces the income gradient. 
The Chakravarty index also puts higher valuations on schooling than longevity, similarly 
to the 2010 HDI. This property appears to be hard to avoid given the differences in distributions 
noted in Figure 1 and the assumed bounds. Of course, increasing the weight on    
   relative to 
that on   
  will narrow the gap in the valuations of schooling and longevity. However, I found 
that on even doubling the weight on the life expectancy component (equally weighting the other 
two components) the valuation on schooling still exceeded that on longevity. 
  Figure 12 compares        with     
 . (The Annex also gives     . 
   by country.) The 
overall means are similar for r=0.5 (an un-weighted mean of 0.643 for     . 
  , versus 0.637 for 
      ), but higher for r=0.25 (mean of 0.773). Switching to     
  increases the index for low 
HDI countries, and decreases the upper values for r=0.5, and so gives lower overall inequality in 
the HDIs across countries; for example, the CV falls from 0.291 to 0.194 for r=0.5 and 0.121 for 
r=0.25. While it is clear that the two HDIs in Figure 12 are highly correlated (r=0.980 r=0.5 and 17 
 
0.987 for r=0.25), there are some large changes. For r=0.5, Zimbabwe’s index rises by over 
300%, from the lowest value (by far) of 0.140 based on        to 0.454; it also rises relatively, 
to be the 12
th lowest—reflecting the fact that the additivity property of the Chakravarty index 
puts a higher premium on Zimbabwe’s schooling attainment. Using r=0.25, the upward revision 
to Zimbabwe’s index is even more dramatic, with     .  
  =0.583. The largest decrease is that for 
New Zealand, for which the index falls by 0.094 in switching to     . 
  , and the ranking falls 
from third place to 18
th.  The differences are small at high HDIs using r=0.25 (Figure 12). 
6. Conclusions 
The Human Development Index was introduced in 1990 as an alternative to using 
national income per capita as the metric of development success. Until 2010 the index was an 
equally-weighted mean of scaled attainments in three dimensions: life expectancy, education and 
income. The simplicity of the HDI gave it a transparency that was clearly appealing to many 
users, although the HDI was never quite as simple as one might think at first glance, given the 
transformations embedded in its components. Over 20 years, the Human Development Reports 
(and numerous offshoot reports at national level) have applauded those countries that do well in 
the HDI, and offered advice to others on how they might do better in the HDI stakes. 
A new version of the index was introduced in the 2010 edition of the HDR. The main 
change was to switch from the original additive aggregation function (the arithmetic mean of the 
three components) to a multiplicative function (their geometric mean). The main reason given for 
this change was to allow for imperfect substitutability between the HDI’s three components.  
However, good intentions alone do not make for good measurement. The 2010 HDI is 
both more complicated and more problematic in its tradeoffs across core dimensions. Longevity 
in poor countries has been substantially devalued, though it seems unlikely that this was 
intended. The HDI’s valuation of longevity in the poorest country is now a mere 0.006% of its 
value in the richest country—a far greater difference than in their average incomes (for which the 
poorest country has 0.2% of the national income per capita of the richest). A poor country 
experiencing falling life expectancy due to (say) a collapse in its already weak health-care 
system could still see its HDI improve with even a small rate of economic growth. By contrast, 18 
 
the valuations of extra schooling have risen for most countries and they seem high—some four 
times higher than the valuations typically placed by the labor market on extra schooling.    
There are some contentious value judgments buried in the maths of the HDI. It can be 
granted that a rich person will be able to afford to spend more to live longer than a poor person, 
and will typically do so.  But that does not justify building such inequalities into our assessment 
of progress in “human development.”  Given what we know about the marginal costs of 
extending life expectancy, if one accepted the tradeoffs embodied in the new HDI, one would be 
drawn to conclude that the most promising way to promote human development in the world 
would be by investing in higher life expectancy in rich countries—surely an unacceptable 
implication of the HDI’s tradeoffs. And it is unclear why we would want to put so much higher a 
value on schooling than implied by its economic returns.  
Setting the tradeoffs in a composite index is never going to be easy and it is ultimately up 
to users to judge for themselves if they accept the HDI’s valuations. However, the troubling 
tradeoffs in the new HDI are not in fact essential to relaxing the perfect substitutability property 
of the old HDI. The less appealing properties of the new index could have been avoided to a 
large extent, while allowing imperfect substitutability, by using an alternative aggregation 
function already found in the literature—in fact a straightforward generalization of the old HDI.    
An important lesson for future composite indices is the need for transparency about the 
implicit tradeoffs, especially in more complicated indices. Those tradeoffs are the key to 
understanding the properties and implications of the index. I would hazard to guess that if the 
authors of the 2010 Human Development Report had calculated the tradeoffs implicit in their 
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         Figure 1: Densities of the three scaled indicators used by the 2010 HDI 
 
 
Note: Kernel density functions using Epanechnikov kernel (calculated using Eviews 7). 
Source: Author’s calculations from the data for 2008 provided in UNDP (2010). 
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                   Figure 3: Weights on life expectancy in the old and new HDI  
 
Source (this figure and all following ones): Author’s calculation from data for 2008 provided in the 2010 HDR. The 
fitted line is a locally smoothed (nonparametric) regression. 



































































































































































Figure 5: Value of an extra year of life expectancy as percent of gross national income 
  











5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
























































































5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0
Gross national income ($ per person per year; log scale)
New HDI
Old HDI (new bounds)






















































Figure 7: Implicit monetary values attached to an extra year of schooling by the 2010 HDI 
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Figure 9: HDI’s valuations of schooling and longevity across countries 
 
Figure 10: Weights on life expectancy in an alternative HDI using the Chakravarty index 
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     Figure 11: Valuations of longevity in the 2010 HDI vs. alternative HDI 
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1  Norway  0.938 58809.53 5676.31 23703.14 0.887 
2  Australia  0.937 38691.71 3421.38 13962.64 0.856 
3 New  Zealand  0.907  25437.50  2119.82  8388.97  0.813 
4  United  States  0.902 47093.85 4478.40 19194.40 0.848 
5  Ireland  0.895 33077.57 2913.07 12483.41 0.821 
6  Liechtenstein  0.891 81011.42 8439.05 41445.94 0.899 
7  Netherlands  0.890 40657.78 3719.45 16763.15 0.832 
8  Canada  0.888 38668.37 3464.53 15830.11 0.827 
9  Sweden  0.885 36936.27 3269.29 15057.89 0.822 
10  Germany  0.885 35308.04 3153.65 13867.94 0.818 
11  Japan  0.884 34692.46 2944.15 14268.21 0.817 
12  Korea  (Republic  of)  0.877 29517.62 2566.25 11151.29 0.804 
13  Switzerland  0.874 39849.09 3522.89 17750.42 0.824 
14  France  0.872 34340.71 2980.43 14496.23 0.812 
15  Israel  0.872 27831.34 2339.34 10600.29 0.797 
16  Finland  0.871 33871.73 3008.29 14054.14 0.811 
17 Iceland  0.869  22917.03  1826.53  8555.26  0.790 
18  Belgium  0.867 34872.70 3103.36 14723.96 0.810 
19  Denmark  0.866 36404.41 3353.66 15402.79 0.813 
20  Spain  0.863 29661.16 2518.96 12172.00 0.799 
21  Hong  Kong,  China  0.862 45090.48 4055.56 21856.34 0.826 
22 Greece  0.855  27580.38  2370.80 11034.24 0.790 
23  Italy  0.854 29619.21 2507.96 12664.21 0.795 
24  Luxembourg  0.852 51109.19 4902.85 25604.28 0.831 
25  Austria  0.851 37055.90 3329.38 16972.02 0.806 
26  United  Kingdom  0.849 35087.16 3153.20 15864.71 0.803 
27  Singapore  0.846 48893.19 4592.41 25475.05 0.827 
28 Czech  Republic  0.841  22678.39 1965.98  8231.51 0.769 
29  Slovenia  0.828 25857.03 2227.93 11182.50 0.775 
30  Andorra  0.824 38056.49 3413.24 19086.43 0.792 
31 Slovakia  0.818  21657.78  1921.00  8138.31  0.755 
32  United Arab Emirates  0.815  58005.80  5903.94  33267.11  0.823 
33 Malta  0.815  21004.33  1699.77  8690.60  0.754 
34 Estonia  0.812  17167.68  1487.76  5855.15  0.742 
35 Cyprus  0.810  21962.46  1796.11  9358.27  0.753 
36 Hungary  0.805  17472.12  1516.02  6172.92  0.739 
37  Brunei  Darussalam  0.805 49914.55 4973.92 29356.66 0.809 
38  Qatar  0.803 79426.35 8783.13 53049.90 0.856 
39  Bahrain  0.801 26663.87 2425.78 11974.10 0.758 
40  Portugal  0.795 22105.19 1836.83 10251.37 0.751 
41 Poland  0.795  17803.06  1492.03  6939.45  0.736 
42 Barbados  0.788  21672.62  1836.05  9633.26  0.741 
43  Bahamas  0.784 25200.64 2337.02 11208.73 0.743 
44 Lithuania  0.783  14823.72  1283.76  5161.69  0.723 
45 Chile  0.783  13561.02  1019.85  5140.75  0.721 
46 Argentina  0.775  14603.33  1178.66  5649.88  0.720 
47  Kuwait  0.771 55718.61 5613.54 39630.67 0.805 
48 Latvia  0.769  12944.18  1068.14  4565.53  0.711 
49 Montenegro  0.769  12490.82  993.23  4435.56  0.709 28 
 
50 Romania  0.767  12843.70  1054.06  4539.88  0.709 
51 Croatia  0.767  16388.59  1332.95  6944.98  0.719 
52 Uruguay  0.765  13808.44  1081.52  5596.90  0.716 
53  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  0.755  17067.63  1456.92  7872.34  0.721 
54 Panama  0.755  13346.85  1050.64  5316.92  0.704 
55  Saudi  Arabia  0.752 24726.01 2329.44 12592.96 0.729 
56 Mexico  0.750  13971.41  1096.99  5897.98  0.704 
57 Malaysia  0.744  13926.86  1131.77  5733.77  0.698 
58 Bulgaria  0.743  11139.16  875.50  4088.97  0.692 
59  Trinidad and Tobago  0.736  24233.27  2427.76  11862.34  0.714 
60 Serbia  0.735  10449.37  799.50  3896.45  0.687 
61 Belarus  0.732  12925.70  1139.08  4976.54  0.690 
62 Costa  Rica  0.725  10869.63  772.51  4680.14  0.684 
63  Peru  0.723 8424.21 619.21  2941.36 0.677 
64  Albania  0.719 7976.33 545.63  2871.56 0.673 
65 Russian  Federation  0.719  15258.16  1467.10  6371.23  0.687 
66 Kazakhstan  0.714  10234.32 933.95  3452.71 0.673 
67  Azerbaijan  0.713 8746.57 685.12  3042.79 0.669 
68  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  0.710 8221.59 580.86  3097.88 0.670 
69  Ukraine  0.710 6535.14 496.17  1893.01 0.665 
70 Iran  0.702  11764.21  969.75  5290.62  0.675 
71 Macedonia  0.701  9486.86 706.88  3925.63 0.667 
72 Mauritius  0.701  13343.58  1128.13  6353.35  0.677 
73 Brazil  0.699  10606.97  836.84  4692.70  0.671 
74  Georgia  0.698 4901.91 320.60  1350.18 0.657 
75 Venezuela  0.696  11846.23  936.48  5891.66  0.677 
76  Armenia  0.695 5494.61 356.40  1706.02 0.656 
77  Ecuador  0.695 7931.24 556.11  3186.96 0.664 
78  Belize  0.694 5693.06 355.77  1916.05 0.658 
79  Colombia  0.689 8588.94 637.55  3567.00 0.661 
80  Jamaica  0.688 7206.85 521.82  2587.66 0.653 
81  Tunisia  0.683 7979.31 571.47  3465.21 0.661 
82  Jordan  0.681 5955.98 403.56  2056.91 0.650 
83 Turkey  0.679  13359.24  1127.01  7031.20  0.665 
84  Algeria  0.677 8320.16 618.51  3540.00 0.653 
85  Tonga  0.677 4038.39 248.82  1095.64 0.647 
86  Fiji  0.669 4315.42 287.22  1183.58 0.641 
87  Turkmenistan  0.669 7052.09 586.07  2368.95 0.641 
88  Dominican  Republic  0.663 8272.56 615.31  3713.07 0.645 
89  China  0.663 7258.47 515.29  3035.41 0.642 
90  El  Salvador  0.659 6498.11 460.96  2545.60 0.638 
91  Sri  Lanka  0.658 4886.32 305.40  1703.59 0.637 
92  Thailand  0.654 8000.62 631.83  3531.18 0.641 
93 Gabon  0.648  12746.55  1344.54  5904.01  0.641 
94  Suriname  0.646 7092.90 542.06  2963.10 0.631 
95  Bolivia  0.643 4357.24 308.97  1299.76 0.626 
96  Paraguay  0.640 4585.32 292.73  1618.00 0.626 
97  Philippines  0.638 4002.08 244.75  1294.56 0.624 
98 Botswana  0.633  13204.19  1633.21  5605.66  0.630 
99 Moldova  0.623  3149.33  190.72  870.18  0.616 
100  Mongolia  0.622 3619.27 237.33  1091.62 0.616 
101  Egypt  0.620 5889.20 417.97  2584.28 0.615 
102 Uzbekistan  0.617  3084.89  188.27  849.43  0.612 
103 Micronesia  0.614  3265.55  199.79  971.52  0.610 
104 Guyana  0.611  3302.06  207.51  988.85  0.608 
105  Namibia  0.606 6323.11 549.78  2550.19 0.603 29 
 
106  Honduras  0.604 3750.11 223.51  1419.53 0.608 
107  Maldives  0.602 5408.10 361.96  2760.11 0.614 
108  Indonesia  0.600 3956.84 245.08  1612.44 0.609 
109 Kyrgyzstan  0.598  2291.23  125.07  567.96  0.606 
110  South  Africa  0.597 9812.13 1257.63 3947.21 0.603 
111  Syrian  Arab  Republic 0.589 4759.93 293.98  2413.75 0.603 
112 Tajikistan  0.580  2019.88  107.47  483.51  0.596 
113  Viet  Nam  0.572 2994.76 158.76  1214.34 0.593 
114  Morocco  0.567 4627.57 298.70  2514.32 0.591 
115 Nicaragua  0.565  2567.40  131.63  947.65  0.590 
116  Guatemala  0.560 4693.74 310.64  2645.98 0.587 
117  Equatorial  Guinea  0.538 22217.60 3517.38 16938.12 0.594 
118  Cape  Verde  0.534 3305.62 191.53  1862.77 0.579 
119  India  0.519 3337.37 227.19  1633.98 0.556 
120  Timor-Leste  0.502 5303.20 439.10  4169.13 0.559 
121  Swaziland  0.498 5132.03 656.42  2104.38 0.528 
122  Lao  PDR  0.497 2321.00 134.37  1008.58 0.544 
123 Solomon  Islands  0.494  2171.56  119.52  935.34  0.544 
124 Cambodia  0.494  1867.66  108.01  625.40  0.541 
125  Pakistan  0.490 2678.26 158.95  1321.20 0.535 
126  Congo  0.489 3257.64 287.54  1351.59 0.524 
127  Sao Tome and Principe  0.488  1917.63  102.58  788.84  0.545 
128 Kenya  0.470  1627.74  105.34  464.00  0.522 
129 Bangladesh  0.469  1587.24  76.96  600.51  0.532 
130 Ghana  0.467  1385.47  79.92  362.56  0.525 
131 Cameroon  0.460  2196.89  180.09  776.82  0.509 
132 Myanmar  0.451  1595.53  85.15  655.08  0.521 
133  Yemen  0.439 2386.63 146.08  1652.56 0.517 
134 Benin  0.435  1499.11  78.61  659.13  0.514 
135  Madagascar  0.435 953.06  40.80  245.20 0.523 
136  Mauritania  0.433 2118.32 145.71  1063.74 0.498 
137  Papua  New  Guinea  0.431 2227.10 140.01  1229.15 0.494 
138 Nepal  0.428  1200.79  50.53  506.32  0.521 
139  Togo  0.428 843.78  32.06  204.09 0.523 
140 Comoros  0.428  1176.07  50.33  516.88  0.528 
141 Lesotho  0.427  2021.15  196.36  688.58  0.487 
142 Nigeria  0.423  2156.50  195.96  875.52  0.482 
143 Uganda  0.422  1224.06  72.29  379.96  0.501 
144 Senegal  0.411  1815.78  120.80  917.62  0.484 
145  Haiti  0.404 949.00  40.11  292.97 0.496 
146  Angola  0.403 4941.20 600.42  3825.19 0.462 
147  Djibouti  0.402 2471.38 185.87  1585.79 0.469 
148 Tanzania  0.398  1344.29  76.77  543.43  0.475 
149 Côte  d'Ivoire  0.397  1624.86  97.39  861.41  0.476 
150 Zambia  0.395  1358.52  105.48  420.94  0.467 
151 Gambia  0.390  1357.68  78.66  675.75  0.482 
152 Rwanda  0.385  1190.34  76.06  465.36  0.481 
153  Malawi  0.385 910.97  45.29  272.01 0.482 
154  Sudan  0.379 2051.14 133.69  1491.15 0.460 
155 Afghanistan  0.349  1419.08  124.65  654.38  0.437 
156  Guinea  0.340 953.46  43.34  629.57 0.473 
157  Ethiopia  0.328 992.03  49.59  715.36 0.460 
158  Sierra  Leone  0.317 808.72  45.86  314.82 0.431 
159  Central African Republic  0.315  757.85  42.03  256.68  0.426 
160 Mali  0.309  1171.31  79.04  983.35  0.434 
161  Burkina  Faso  0.305 1214.83  72.41  1184.36 0.429 30 
 
162 Liberia  0.300  319.81  5.51  37.20  0.496 
163 Chad  0.295  1066.75  68.59  831.27  0.414 
164  Guinea-Bissau  0.289 538.09  22.48  177.42 0.437 
165  Mozambique  0.284 854.09  49.86  672.17 0.426 
166 Burundi  0.282  401.57  11.54  86.22  0.451 
167  Niger  0.261 675.38  29.55  445.12 0.399 
168 Congo  0.239  291.23  6.04  33.38  0.428 
169 Zimbabwe  0.140  176.17  0.51  1.68  0.454 
Sources: HDI and GNI from HDR web site; valuations are the author’s calculations from the data on the same site. 